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l. INTRODUCTION 
The characterization of external effe:·�ts as "separable11 has 
played an important role in the development o.f th.e'theory of externalities. 
The separable case appears particularly well behaved when procedures 
for achieving an optimum allocation of resources in the presence of 
externalities are examined. Three examples can illustrate the range 
of conclusions which have been reached conc1�rning separable externalities. 
Davis and Whinston ( 1962] find that separability assures the existence 
of a certain kind of equilibrium in bargaining between firms which create 
externalities, and that equilibrium does not E�xist without separability, 
Kneese and Bower ( 1968] argue that with sepa.rability the computation of 
Pigovian taxes to remedy externalities is particularly simple. Marchand 
and Russell [ 1974] demonstrate that certain liability �ules regarding 
external effects lead to Pareto optimal outcornes if and only if externalities 
are separable. In these and other articles an externality is defined as 
separable if the cost function of an affected firm has a specific form, 
stated in Definition 1 of this paper. With few exceptions, explorations 
of the implications of separability have assurned that equilibria and 
optima can be characterized in terms of classical first-order conditions 
of profit-maximization. Examination of the class of production functions 
z 
which are compatible with separable externalities reveals, however, 
that separable externalities cause a distinctive non-convexity when the 
possibility that a firm will shut down rather than accept negative profits 
is introduced. Since numerous policies for dealing, for example, with 
environmental damage have been based on theoretical investigations 
of externalities, a defect in those investigations can have serious 
consequences. In this paper we characterize the class of production 
functions which generate separable externalities. These results are 
used to show that all production functions in this class contain a non­
convex part. Some of the consequences of this non-convexity for market 
structure in the presence of separable externalities are examined. 
Finally, examples are giveµ which suggest some conditions under which 
a competitive equilibriwn may exist in the presence of externalities 
and some conditions under which it may not. 
Z. SEPARABLE EXTERNALITIES IN COST AND PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS 
Let C(Y1, Y2) be the cost function of a firm which produces Y1, 
and suffers an external diseconomy which is a function of Y2. That 
cost function is defined in terms of a production function F( Xl, . . •  , Xn' Y z ), 
in the following manner: 
C(Y
l, yz) = min L W.X. 
i l l 
subject to Y1 = F(X1, . .. , Xn' Y2). 
We assume throughout that C and F are continuously twice 
differentiable, and that F is strictly quasi-concave. Some precise 
definitions and lemmas regarding separability are needed:
1 
1
These strong definitions are defended and related to alternative 
definitions of separability in an Appendi..x to this paper. 
Definition 1: A cost function C ( Y1, Y 2) is separable if and only if it 
can be written as c1(Y1) + C2(Y2). 
Definition 2: A production function F{X1, . .. ,Xn,Y2) is separable 
if and only if it can be \Vl:'itten. as g( xl ..... xn) + h( y 2 ). 
Lemma 1: 
everywhere. 
Proof: 
z 
A cost function is separable if and only if (;� � 
l Yz 
Necessity is proved by differentiating C = C + c2 
twice and 
z 1 
observing that d� �y = O. Sufficiency is proved
2 
by 
I Z 
0 
3 
observing that the general solution of the :s,econd-order partial differential 
z 
equation O� �y =- 0 is of the form
 C = c1(Y1) + C2{Y2).
I Z 
2
Lester Ford, [ 1955], p. 251 derives this result. 
The problem is to find what gene:r·al cl3fs of functions F 
0 c 
give rise to cost functions with the property �)(�y 1 z 
= 0. It has 
been c.laimed by Marchand and Russell tha.t a cost function is separable 
if and on_ly if the production function from which it is derived is separable 
as defined above. This conjecture is false in both directions. We begin by 
giving a simple example of a separable production function which does 
not ge11erate a separable cost function. It will be seen later that the 
class of separable functions does not exha:ust the class of func'tions 
giving ·rise to separable cost functions. 
4 
Conslder a production. function of the form 
F 
. • p x1 x2 - CYZ (I)  
where 11 + f3 < 1. W e  find the cost function b y  solving the cost­
minimization problem and using the first-order conditions and the 
production function to eliminate the inputs from the cost equation. 
From the first-order conditions we have 
WI 
wz 
a.x2 
pxl
Solving for x1 and substituting in ( 1) gives 
YI xa.
+.6 _z_ 
(w • ) " 
z w1P 
CY2 
( z) 
( 3) 
Solving ( 3) for x2 � and substituting the resulting expression for x2 
in ( -2) enables us to express x1 and x2 in terms of Y 1 and 
Substitution in C ::::: w1x1 + w2x2 gives the cost function 
• 
c 
( • )fWz .-)•+P wz1+ 7i\w1p (Y1+
Clearly ( 4 )  is not sepal-able if a + {J # l. 
_l_ 
CYzr
+P
Y2 alone. 
. ( 4) 
To find a production function which does generate a separable 
z 
f . 0 c . f th d . .  cost unction we express OY OY in terms o e er1vatives of I Z 
the production function, and then find solutions of the partial 
z 
differential equation which results when ,; Cl� is set equal to zero. ' 
I Z 
5 
The general relation between c1::ist and production functions is 
fotmd by adopting the approach of Samuelson1s Foundations. 
the constrained cost minimization problem 
).f_in imize �W
i
X
i 
subject to Y1 - ]'(X1, • • •  ,Xn) = 0. ' 
\'le adopt the following abbreviations 
2!:_ = F oX. i ' 
2 g_K._ = F ()Xi()Xj ij 
oF 
oY = FY 
o2F 
oX.oY = FiY ' 
F 11. F ln Fl 
F Let ti = F • • • nn nl 
F l • • •  :Fn 
Further let A .. be the i, j th co-fa ctor of � 'J 
F n 
0 
Consider 
Theorem 1: A cost function is separable if and only if it is derived 
fro::-: a production function whi.::h satisfies 
Dli . + Ii F = O. iY n+l, i n+l.n+l Y 
' 
at e\"ery point which is a proper cost nlinimurn. 
Proof: By Lemma 1 the cost function is separable if and only if 
o2c = O. We express oYloYZ 
o2c 
oY1oY2 
in terms of the pr.eduction function 
as follows. 
Form the Lagrangian expression 
L I;w .x. + >.. ( Y1 - F ( x1 . . • x , Y2) ) . l 1 n 
' 
First-order conditions are 
,.. " . 
' 
IS. ' 
Y1 - F = 0
0 
6 
Vle perturb the solution by varying Y 1 and Y2• Totally differentiating 
the first-order conditions g ives the system of equations 
F l l  0 • • F ln Fl\ f dXl \ 
Fn l . 
F l 
F F ) \ dX ) nn n n 
Fn o. d)JA 
= 
dW1 
F lYdYZ ), 
dW n 
FnYdY2 ), 
dY1 - FydY2 ( 6) 
Solving for ciXk using Cramer's rule gives
d
�
= 
Eil(� - FiYdY2) 6ik + (dYl - FidY2)6n+l,J 
A 
We assume that F is strictly quasi-concave in � • . .  
/', i 0. 
Then 
oXk = oY2 
- LFiYAik i 
F:l'.""A n+l, 
A 
Since C = L\VkXk, k 
and 
Since 'Vk 
� oY2 
oc 
oY2 
l.Fk,
oc 
oY2 
oXk 
= L:wkoY;-k 
-�wk[� FiYAik + FYAn+l, k] 
A 
-�JFiYA(fFkf'.ik)]- >.FyL FkAn+l,kk 
6 
X , so that n 
7 8 
But LFkA l k = /',, k n+ • 
and LFkAik k 
0 since it is an expansion by 
alien co-factors. Therefore 
� oY2 
-I.FY ( 7) 
Differentiating ( 7) with respect to Y 1 gives 
From (6}. 
Therefore 
o2C
oY2aY1 
ax;� F -- -- 1.L. iY oYl ' 
F il_YoY 1
o>. 
oY1 
Alln+l, n+l A 
oX . 
' 
oY1
.6.n+l. i
A 
o2C
oY2?Y1 >. ('<" )
- L,F A +A F /;,. . iY n+l, i n+l, n+l Y 
' 
Characterizing the class of production functions which generate 
separable cost functions reduces to finding the general form of the 
solution of 
LF A . +A F = 0 
_ iY n+l, 1 n+l, n+l Y ( 8) ' 
Three imrnediate consequences of ( 8) are of interest. 
Corollaryl: If F is of the forrnof g(X1, • . .  ,Xn) + h(Y2) where g is 
homogeneous of degree one, then F generates a separable cost function. 
9 
�: Obviously FiY = 0 for all i. If g is homogeneous of degree 
one then [g .. ! = /J. _,_ 1 = 0 '\vherever evaluated [Quirk and Saposnik, lJ n, l, n+ 
1963]. Therefore F satisfies ( 8 ). 
Corollary 2:. If the cost function C ( Y 1, Y 2:) and the production function 
F(X1, ... ,Xn, Yz) are both separable and FY 1- 0 everywhere, then 
lgijl = o. 
� By separability of the cost functio·n ( 8} holds. Separability of 
the production function implies FiY = 0 for all i. Therefore 
�n+l,n+l = jgijl = O 
Corollary 3: 
F y ¢ 0 and 
If the pr9duction fun.:tion F1[X1, • • .  , Xn, Y z) is separable, 
fg .. j I- 0, then the cost function is not separable. •J 
� By hypothesis FiY 
does not vanish. 
0 and FY& 1 1 1 O. Therefore ( 8) n+ ,n+ 
It is possible to find a general solution for ( 8} 'vhen there 
is just one input, denoted :x. Then ( 8) becomes 
FXFYX F F = 0 y xx ( 9 ) 
( 9 I i> equal to the numerator of toe expresoion 0°X (; :)· Thus the 
solution of (9) will be a function such that the ratio of F to F is y x 
independent of X .  
F 
Let _y 
FX 
Then for any fixed. value of F, 
dX 
dY 
-¢( y) 
OiY) 
to 
In Figure 1, these level surfaces are illustrated. Each is simply a 
horizontal displacement of some other level surface (isoquant). Denote 
each isoquant C(A}. Then on.any isoquant X = A + f(Y) where f is 
some a:r:bitrary function. The function F which solves ( 9) is an 
arbitrary function of A, say F = A(A). Thus F = A (x + h(Y)} , where 
3
A and h are arbitrary functions, 
y 
x 
which may be restricted to preserve the concavity and strict quasi­
concavity of F. We check that this solution works by differentiating: 
' 
FX A 
FY hA 
F ' _l= h(Y) FX 
31 am indebted to Joel Frankiin for this demonstration. 
F 
There are two obvious ways of ge1neralizing the form 
A (x + h(Y2 >) to the n-input case: 
F = B(x1 + h1(Y2). . . • •  xn + hn(Y2)) 
where B and h , ... , h are arbitrary functions or-, n . 
F = A (g(X1, ... ,Xn) + h(Y2)) 
( 10) 
( ll) 
where A and h are. arbitrary functions and I g. ·I = 0. We will show lJ 
that both (10) and (11) are solutions of (8). Though (10) and (11) 
11 
bear some obvious resemblances to each other. it �oes not appear that 
either is the most general form of a solution of (8).
and 
The proof that ( 10) solves ( 8) is nearly trivial. 
o2F
ax;oY2 
oF 
oY2 
'
'<"' B .. h. L.J 1J J 
j 
' 
I;Bihi i 
Substituting, (8) becomes 
'<"' h '. ( " B .li . + li 1B.) ":-- J � lJ n+l,1 n+l, n+ J J l 
We .compute 
This expression is identically zero, since the expression in parentheses 
is an expansion of t:l by alien co-factors. (The jth column of the matrix 
is multiplied by the co-factors of the n+l column.) 
12 
Somewhat more work is needed to show that ( 8) is satisfied when 
F has the form 
A(g(Xi' .... Xn) + h(Y2)) 
where A and h are arbitrary functions and [g .. J = 0. We demonstrate >J 
that this is the case by establishing a relation between co-factors of 
and co-factors of 
A .. lJ 
A. J 
gij 
g
j 
Ai 
!A l 
0 
gi 
I G I 
0 
It is well known that IA I (A')n+t lG I .
Write 
A A. "ij l 
A. o I l 
II 2 r 
A gl + A gll 
. 
" ' 
A gngl +A gnl ' 
\ ' A gl . . . 
An glgn + 
A' gln 
1' 2 I 
. A  gn +A gnn 
' 
A gn 
Ai gl 
A' g n 
0 
Then ( 8) becomes 
" ' I I D. h gi A n+l,i i 
+ A' h'IAI = 0n+l,n+l 
Since EA' g.IAI +l . o jAj, we have, if . l n , 1 
' 
h ' 0 
' 
A:
• jAj + A 'jAjn+l,n+l" 0 A 
( 12) 
Lemma 3: If 
then 
�C .. : CJc = . :� . � . .. : 
c . . 0 J • 
jc I= -I;L:c.c.!c .. I· .i j l J lJ l, J 
where le.· I ·. is the co-factor of C . . in the ·co-factor IC I 1 , 1.J 13 lJ n+ ,n+l. 
Proof: Expa..Ttd IC j by its last column, obtaining
j cjoL: cijcJi,n+l
' 
lc21 ... c2nl jC11 • • • cln 
I · n+2 J Zn+!oCl . (-1) + . . . +C (-1) 1c C n C ' C nl nn n-1 n-1,n Gl c ell · G n n 
13 14 
Now expa.rid each determinant in this sum by its last row, obtaining 
czz · · · czn CZl. • . C2 n-1 
Jcjoc1c1j : 
n+Z n+l (-1) (-1) + . . . + c1cn J (-J)
n+Z(-l)Zn
cn2 • • •  cnn 
' 
c12 · · · cln 
+en c1 I c • · . n-1, 2 c n-l,11 
C I .. . C l n n,n-
cu ... c 
(-l)2n+l(-l)n+l+ . • •  + C C n n . . 
l,n-1 
c n-1, 1 c n-1, n-1 
Cu . c1 ·-1•c1 ·+1· • J • J cln
=L:I:c.c: 1 ci-J . • l J c l J i+l 
Zn+l+i+j( -1) 
cn . . • . . . . . . . . . . c nn 
Now 
Jciilii 
Therefore 
(-J)i+j
cu. 
c i-1 1 
c i+l, 1 
c n, l 
cl · 1· cl · 1 • J- , J+ 
.G . ,C n, 3-l n+l 
Jcj" -I;L;c c Jc J . 
i j l J lJ 1, J 
cln 
C. I 1- ,n
C i+l, n
c nn 
I (-l)Zn+\-1/n
Quirk and Ruppert [ 1968] have shown that for a matrix of 
the forrr1 of A, using tb.e rule for evaluating the determinant of the 
sum of two matrices gives 
!A ln+l n+l (A')n!GI +l +! + A"(A')
n
-
l
I;Lg.g./G . . / ..n , n _ _ 1 J lJ 1, J 1 J . 
Using our lemma, 
/A/n+l n+l 
= (A'Jn/G I  + · n+l,n+l 
= (A'l
n
/GL+l.n+l -
A"(A' )
n-lL�g.g.jG . . / . . 
i 
. j 1 J 1J 1, J
A"(A')n-
1
/Gj
= (A'Jn lGI - A"(A')-2/A/h+l, n+l 
Therefore ( 12) becomes 
A" 
A' !Al+ (A')
n
+
l
JGb+l,n+l - !'.'.!
Al= 0 ( 13) 
But ! Gl+l,n+l = 0 by hypothesis, so that the left hand side of {13) 
vanishes identically. 
15 
The generalization to the case whei�e firm 1 is affected by 
externalities from many firms is immediate. We define separability 
with lT'.any sources of externality as follows; 
Definition l': A cost function C(Y1, Y2, • • .  , Ym
) is separable if and 
only if it ca. ten as C1(Y1) + C2(Y2 , • • .  ,Ym
). 
Definition 2': A production function F(X1, • . .  ,Xn, Y2 , .. . , Ym
) is 
separable if and only if it can be written as g(:X:1, • • •  ,Xn ) + h(Y2 , . . •  , Ym) . 
A revised version of Lemma 1 is needed, 
Lemma 11: A cost fnnction is separable if and only if everywhere 
o2c 
oY1oYj 
0 for j z •. . .  , m 
It follows that (8}, rewritten as 
DiY.An+l,i 
i J 
+ 
6.n+l, ll+l
F y. J 
( 8') 
must hold for j = 2, . . . , m. An argument almost identical to that 
used for the case of one firm causing externality establishes that 
{ 81) is satisfied by 
and by 
A (g(X1, ... ,Xn) + h(Y2 , . . . , Ym)) 
F � B (x1 +l:h .(Y.). • • • X +Xh . (Y.)) · j lJ J n j nJ J 
F with lg .. J ') 0
16 
3. SEPARABLE EXTERNALITIES AND COMPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM
Theorem 1 and its three corollaries establish that representation 
of externalities as separable in the cost function is not in general 
equivalent to repre sentation as separable in the production function. 
Using the derivation of the general form of the one-input production 
function which gives r ise to a separable cost function, we can contrast 
the behavioral i1nplications of the two forms of separability. In this 
discussion firm 1 \•:ill alv;'ays be affected by the externality, and firm 2 
\'>ill al\vays cause the externality. Initially, it is assumed that firm 1 
is always at an interior profit n1axiinun.-1, producing positive output fron1 
po.sitive input and earning non-ncgq.tive profits. For reasoc1s to be 
17 
discussed shortly, this assumption is not always valid, and the analysis 
is quite different when it fails. 
\'lhen the production function is separa.ble, the marginal 
productivity of any factor used by firm 1 is ind.e�pendent of Y2• the output 
of firm 2. Therefore at an interior maximmn for which the first order 
conditions a.re necessary, firm l's input choice is independent of the 
activity of firm 2. When the cost function is separable, marginal cost 
of producing Y 1 is independent of Y2, and firrn 11s output choice is 
:independent of firm 21s activity. If both the production function and 
the cost f\Ulction axe separable, then input and output of firm 1 are 
4 
independent of firm Z's activity. 
4
These propositions correct the claim by 'Wellisz ( 1964] that 
separable externalities do not affect resource allocation. It is true 
that the cost-function separability which he COilsiders implies that 
the allocation of output is unaltered, but in general the allocation of 
inputs i's affected by devices which 11internaliz��11 external effects. 
These propositions can be illustrated diagrammatically in a 
simple fashion for the one-input case. In each figure the production 
function satisfies F(O,Y2) = O; i.e., it goes through the origin. In 
Figure l th1;:. production function is characterized by decreasing returns 
and separability. Since the same input must b4;:. profit-maximizing for 
all Y2, changes in Y2 shift the production function vertically, keeping 
the slope of F{X 1, Y2) the same for constant :Kl
" 
18 
YI 
g{X1l - h(O) 
g(X
l
) - h(Y2) 
·
--
xl 
Figure l 
yl 
19 
In Figure 2 a production function of the forn1 F(x1 - h(Y2}) 
is dra'.vn. Changing Y2 in this case shift:s the production function 
horiz.o::itally, so that the slope of F is constant for constant Y. This 
l 
prodi.:.ction function gener.ates a separable cost function. 
,/ 
F(X1) 
�+,·•',>) 
------ ---------�-
x1 
Figure 2 
yl 
20 
In Figure 3 the production function is separable and generates 
a separable cost fmtction. Such a function rpust have the property that 
the slope of F(X1, Y 2) equals the slope of F(X1, YZ) for constant x1 
and also for constant Y !" For this to be true for all X1 and Y l' F 
must be linear in Xl' as is proved by Corollary 2. 
g(Xl) 
g(Xl) - h('\'2 ) 
Figure 3 l h( y ) x 2 l 
'\\-ith one input it is only possible to have a separable cost 
function and a separable production function v.-hen the production 
function is linear in X
I
" But this case is not one which will ever be 
observeC. in a market which is in equilibrium, because of a non­
convexity v.·hich is introduced by the separable externality. Indeed, 
the sa�e non-convexity besets all situaticms in which there are 
5 
separable exi:ernalities of any type. 
Zl 
5
vlellisz, Starrett andinada and Kuga have also noted the presence 
of such non-convexity with externalities. The relation of this section 
to their contribution can.be sketched briefly. Starrett and Inoda and 
Kuga analyze a non-convexity which arise:s for similar reasons to those 
for which the non-convexity in this paper arises. They consider the 
implications of the non-convexity for the possibility of achieving a 
Pareto-optimum when market institutions are used to internalize 
externaliti es. We concentrate on the initial competitive equilibrium 
which is not in general Pareto-optimal, because no markets exist in 
'\Vhich externalities could be traded. Wellisz's observations are more 
in the vein of this paper, since he points out that firms have the choice 
of shutting down and that separable externalities impose fixed costs. 
Con.sider first the case illustrat,ed in Figure 3. Although these 
argurnents generalize easily to the case in which the production function 
is separable and g( X1, • • •  , Xn) is homogeneous of degree one, exposition 
is simplified by considering the one-input case in which g(X1) is linear 
and homogeneous. Under these assumptions the production function is 
a straight line· through the origin when h( Y2) = O. Let h{O) = 0 and 
h' > 0. Then for any Y2 f:. 0, firm 
1 has a fixed cost inflicted on it by 
the externality. If the ratio of the price of output to the price of input, 
p/>v, is less than or equal to the slope of the production function, firm 1 
\\'ill earn negative profits whenever it uses positive input. If p/':' is 
greater than the slope of the production function, firm l can earn 
unbounded positive profits by increasing x1 >vithout bound. Therefore, 
ii Y 2 i 0 it \vill be impossible to observe a firm affected by an externality 
22 
which is separable i n  the cost function a n d  the production function 
producing finite, non-zero output in equilibrium. This fact has 
important consequences for the structure of a competitive economy 
>vith separable externalities. To explore these consequences >ve must 
go f::.-om the partial equilibrium analysis used thus far to an explicit 
general equilibrium approach. 
Consider an economy in which there are two firms, each 
hav"ing a production function g. ( X.) + h. ( Y.) where h� ¥- 0 everywhere. 
1 1 1 J l 
We can summarize the results of the previous discussion for the case 
gi 
lL"lear and homogeneous by describing the supply correspondence Of 
firm i for fixed Y .• If Y. = 0 the supply correspondence has the J J 
usual proper_ties with constant returns. Let A be the ratio of the price 
of Y. to the price of X. at which firm i can just cover variable costs. l 1 
It is represented as the slope of a vector orthogonal to the production 
function. For p./w. < A firm i produces 
1 1 
firm i >vill produce any output; for p./w. > l 1 
{See Figure 4} 
zero; for p. /w. = A 1 l 
A supply is undefined. 
When Y. > 0, the supply correspondence of firm i is not J 
continuous. For price ratios less than or equal to A, Y� = O. For 
6 1 price ratios greater than A, Yi is undefined. 
Y. 
1 
A 
l if Y 2 = 0, this section of the 
correspondence exists 
if Y2 1 0, it does not 
Figure 4 
supply 
p
i
/wi 
23 24 
6 . Note that the supply correspondence has this property whether 
firm i uses one or many inputs. As long as g.(X.} is homogeneous 
of degree one we can divide the price space intt tJ:o linear sub.spaces 
P1 and P11 such that if the price vector p ( P1, the firm supplies 
zero outpfil, and if p f P II the supply is tuldefmed. (See Arrow 
and Hahn, pp. 52-59. J 
Three cases can be distinguished: 1) both firms have identical 
production functions; 2) both firms have identical inputs and outputs; 
3) the firms produce different goods, using either the same or different 
inputs. 
�: Vt�e ask if there is a price ratio p/w such that when both firms 
maximize profits Yi>. 0 for both.firms. If p/w !::: A, then y1 > 0 
is not profit-maximizing for firm 1 if Y 
2 
> 0, and vice versa. If p/w > A 
supply is undefined for both firms. Thus both firms cannot produce 
positive output in equilibrium. If Y 1 > 0 and Y z 0, then if p/w = A 
any finite level of output gives firm l. zero profits and is in equilibrium. 
Given that Y1 > 0, Yz = 0 gives firm 2 maximum profits of zero also. 
In this case we can have multiple equilibria, each with just 
one firm p roducing non-zero output. It does not matter which firm is 
out of business. This is characteristic of constant returns, since one 
firm can pr.odU:ce any level of output using the same total input which 
would be used if the output were divided a.mong many firms. Normally 
constant returns imply that the number of firms in an industry is 
indeterminate. With constant returns and separable externality, the 
size of an industry is one firm. 
Case 2: \.\-"hen the two production functio.ns differ, it will ahvays be 
the case that with zero externality one firm can ahvays produce more 
output with given input than could the oth-i;:r. Let A be the slope of a 
vector normal to the steepest production function. In equilibrium 
only the firm with the steepest production function will be in business. 
The other fir1n could earn non-negative profits only if p/w > A. 
But then the most productboe firm could earn unbounded profits, even 
v..·hen it is suffering externalities from the first firm. 
�: If externalities are between firms in different industries, in 
equilibrium still only one firm produces non-zero output. Suppose 
two firms are in operation; the:i:i. if one i; affected by externality, it 
'\vill produce zero or unbounded output depending on the price ratio of 
its output to its i�put. Thus at least one firm is not maximizing profit 
when it cho9ses non-zero finite output. Again multiple equilibria are 
possible -- one firm, in any industry, can survive. 
The arguments given for two firms also apply to the case of 
n firms. If it is impossible to have two firms simultaneously maximizing 
profits and producing positive output, it is impossible to have n, since 
comparing any two firms, we find only one is in operation. Thus we 
have proved the following theorem. 
Theorem 2: If 1) all externalities are production function separable; 
' 
2) g
i 
is homogeneous of degree one; 3) hi f. 0 in the neighborhood 
of equilibrium, then in equilibrium only one firm produces non-zero output. 
With constant returns and separability the competitive equilibrium, 
with only one firm, is also a Pareto optimum. Constant returns imply 
that in the absence of externality one firm can produce any output as 
efficiently as many. The fixed cost imposed by externality implies that 
when more than one firm is in operation more input is needed to produce 
a given output than is needed when only one firm operates. This conclusion 
is hardly grounds for optimism, however, sihce a one-firm market is 
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unlikely to be competitive. Of course, >vith separability and decreasing 
returns the competitive equilibrium will :not be optimal for the usual 
reasons. 
4. CO).fPETITIVE EQUILIBRIUM WITHOUT CONSTANT RETURNS 
Standard proofs of the existence of equilibrium of a competitive 
economy employ assumptions regarding the convexity of production se!:s 
\vhich are ·violated when separable externalities are present. Arrow 
and H2.hn [ 1972] for example, assume in proving existence with 
externalities that the production set of firm i is convex in the variable s 
controlled by firm i for every activity chosen by other firms. For the 
case of se?arability with constant returns we have given a constructive 
argurr..ent that in equilibrium only one firin will exist. Since \vj_th just 
one firm in operation. the fixed cost imposed by externality vanishes, 
equilibril.L-n itself will exist. 
"\\�hen either the cost function or the production fllllction is 
separable, and the production function exhibits decreasing re�uxns, a 
non-convexity \vj_ll still be present. Note that in both Figures 1 and 2 
a fixed cost is imposed on firm 1 v.·hen Y 2 cf 0. For some prices this 
fixed cost v:ill cause firm l to shut down. Consider, for example, 
Figure 2 i."1. 'vhich with the price line dra"l;vn, firm 1 earns at most zero 
profits ... vhen Y2 = Y2. For any price ratio less than this, firm 1 will 
produce zero output. When the price ratio is equal to this break-even 
ratio, firm 1 will jump to a positiYe level of output, and from this point 
on its s"Gpp!y function will be continuous. This discontinuity is 
characteristic of the supply function derived from a production fllllction 
'\vith a non-convex section. It is generated by any type of separable 
cxternality. 
To illustrate the implications of this discontinuity for the
e:.::isten:::e v: equilibrium, consider a case in \Vhich of the t\vO firms 
only one is affected significant�y by the externality. That is, assume 
F
l 
gl(Xl) - hl(Y2) 
and 
F2 g2(X2) 
Assume for simplicity that both firms produce identical goods, and 
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use identical inputs. Then aggregate supply by these firms is Y1 + Y2 
and aggregate input demand is Xl 
+ X2. With externality going only 
one way it is not difficult to determine how Y1 + Y2 will vary with p/w. 
At any price ratio firm 2 will set
6F2 
ax2 
w 
p 
The output thus determined is taken as a parameter by firm l in choosing 
its optimal supply. We take a simple example: 
YI 
l 
a 
xi 
y2
hY
� - 2 
l 
a x2 
where a,. 1. Then maximizing profits firm Z \vill choose 
a 
x
2 (a:f
-l 
and l 
a -1 
(;;; ) y2 
Firm 1 �111 choose
xt 0
or
a
xt (;;)
"-!
depending on whether or not it can earn non
-
negative profits. \Ve can 
write firm l's profits, nl, as a function of p/w. 
Since 
YI 
l 
(;;)
a-!
_p_
h(;; )"
-! 
p a 
nt p[(;;rl - h(*f-
l
J w(;;1;f-l 
P-1 
(;;1;)
a-1[p ph(;;)a-1 -! J 
Since a> l, this expression is positive if 
�' ' a-1 
( l - -!, ) > h(;;) -
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Three C2.ses, which differ in ter1ns of the change :.n rnarginal damage 
:.r.creases, when Y 2 
oF1 
oY 2 
can be distinguished. 
02Fl 
> O; constant is increasing if <lYZ 
2 
-
o2Fl 
,f -
2
- < 0.
o Y z
Marginal damage, defined as 
2 o F1 
if --2- = 0, and decreasing 
oY2 
Case 1: If r.narginal damage is constant, fJ = 1 and the sign oi profit 
is independent of p/w. depending only on whether 1 - l/a > h, in 
which case profits are always positive, or 1 - l/a < h, in which case 
profits are always negative. Since firm 2 produces non-zero output 
for all p/w # 0, 1 - 1/a > h implies that firm 1 can always prod'Q.ce 
some output. The supply function then is 
_!_ I 
yl 
+ Yz z(;;f
-1 
h(-;;;;)"
-1
_!_ 
(_ 
a-I 
= (2- h \;1;
) 
If 1 - l/a. > h, the supply function is 
YI+ y2 
1 
I. )
a-1
Yz = ,-;;;-
B.oth functions are continuous, and no problems can arise. 
11.:! 
a-1 
Case 2: Ii marginal damage is increasing, then fJ > 1 and h /_E_\ ---- \aw/ 
ZS 
is an increasing function of p/w. It is always possible to choose p/w
small enough th.at 
.£.:.!.
(1 - �) > h(*r
l
Therefore for low values of p/w firm 1 can earn positive profits. 
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As p/w increases, however, we can choa•se a large enough value to make 
l!:.!,
( 1 ) 
I. a-1 i - a < h ,;;;) 
· 
so that profits become negative. Let R be that value of p/w for which 
l!:.!. 
1 I. )a-1 i - a = h \� 
Then for p/w :$. R. total supply is 
For p/w 2'.': R, 
Solving for R in 
gives 
1 
( 
)
a-1 
Yi+ yz = 2 * 
_IL
hf--.e._r
t 
1,aw/ 
1 
YI+ YZ y2 (-;;,f
-1 
1 i 
- a 
ti..:! 
h(�Rr
-1 
a-1 
1 
-
czR = ("a� 
l
)
fJ-1 
( 14) 
(IS) 
Substituting R for p/w in ( 14) gives 
1 __[_ 
Yl + Yz 2(a .� i
t-1 
h (a0� if
-
1 
1 
(1 +�)(a� if-
1 
( 16) 
and in ( 15) gives 
1 
YI+ Yz = (
a
� 
tr-I 
( 17) 
Since {16) > (17), the total sµpply function will jump at R, since at 
R{l4), which defines the supply function up to R, is strictly greater 
than ( 15) which defines the supply function from R on. This is 
illustrated in Figure 5. 
YI+ yz 
p/w 
Figure 5 
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ill
( )
<Z-1 
Case 3: If marginal damage is decreasing, then (3 < 1 and h _E_ ---- aw 
is a decreasing function of p/w. By a train of reasoning identical to 
that used in Case 2 we can es�blish that for p/w < R firm 1 cannot 
earn positive profits; for p/w > R it can. Therefore the supply 
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function is { 15) for 0 < p/v.· � R and ( 14) for p/w > R. We have 
established that ( 14) > ( 15) at R. Therefore the supply function jumps, 
as in Figure 6. 
y l + Y.z 
v 
R p/w 
Figure 6 
These discontinuities can interfere with the existence of equilibrium. 
If the demand curve for Y 1 + Y 2 goes thro1llgh the discontinuity, it will 
never be possible to achieve exact equality between supply and demand. 
This is more likely in Case 3, of course, since in Case 2 a demand 
curve must have a positive slope to pass through the discontinuity. 
Such a discontinuity does not necei>sar�ly preclude the_ possibility of 
proving the existence of equilibrium, although proving existence becomes more 
complex. The standard argument (Arrow a:nd Hahn, p. 169-171, Rothenberg ( 1960] J 
3Z 
is that as more firms and consumers are introduced into the economy 
it becomes possible to choose various combinations of firms producing 
zero output and firms producing positive output to approximate demand 
at the price for which the discontinuity exists. Such an argument cannot 
necessarily be made ill this case. As Rothenberg (1960 J pointed out 
there is no guarantee that non-convexities arising from externalities 
will vanish as the number of agents in the economy increases. The 
discontinuity caused by one-way, separable externality will change in 
different ways depending on how the econorhy is expanded. If we let 
the number of polluting firms increase while holding constant the number 
of sufferers, the discontinuity will vanish since the firms affected by 
the non-convexity become srilall relative to the economy. If both classes 
are increased at the same rate, the size of the discontinuity relative to 
aggregate supply may remain roughly constant. 
The analysis of cases in which there are mutual externalities and 
decreasing returns is much more complex. To define the total supply 
correspondence we must make sure that the supply response of any firm 
to given prices is profit-maximizing with respect not only to the prices 
but also with respect to the decision of the other firm. When this is 
done it appears that for some production functions it is impossible"for 
more than one firm to earn positive profits at any prices; in some cases 
two firms can earn positive profits at all prices; in others more firms can. 
Whenever market structure is thus independerit of prices, the system is 
well behaved and the aggregate supply correspondence exhibits no 
discontinuities. We have shoVllI1 that when market structure changes 
with price discontinuities can appear. 
Again, we turn to a simple example to illustrate some important 
relationships. A ssurne two identical firms i = l, 2, with production 
functions 
Y. l 
I 
a 
x
i hY. J
At any price ratio p/w the input choice of firm i will be either 
X. ' 
a 
a-1 
(a;;) 
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or X. = 0, depending on whether Y. is S1J.ch that firrn i can or cannot ' . J 
earn non-negative profits. 
We begin by as.suming that both firms are operating at interior 
maxima. We know the input of X1; but output Y1 depends on the output 
of firm j, which in turn depends on Yi' Y..te cut through this chain by 
solving 
Therefore 
and 
I l 
a-1 
Yi= (a;;) h [(a;;r
i: 
- hYi] 
l 
a..;1 
y - _l_(_E_) i-l+haw 
l � l ] -- a -1 1-a. -1-n. = p(�j _a - " a 
l w l + h 
( 17) 
Profits n1 'Will be positive, with both firms in operation, for all prices 
when h is less than some critical value. We solve 
i 
i-.:a ..2. 
-- 1-a l+h -a ;:; I) 
to find this critical value, ·y,:hich is h a - l. Sine e a is a measure 
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of how strongly returns to scale decrea·se, it is a relation between the 
magnitude of the externality and returns to scale which determines how 
rri.any firms can operate in equilibrium. Since the possibility of earning 
non-negative profits is independent of p/w, the economy will always have 
two firms operating ii h < a - 1, and one firm if h > a - 1. 
This suggests that if a is sufficiently large, it may be possible 
to have more than two firms in operation. Suppose there are n + 1 
identical firms, with pr?<1uction functions 
Y. ' 
l 
a 
xi - hI>. j;li J 
Clearly every firm which is in operation will choose identical Xi. Thus 
we can again solve 
l l 
Y. = (..Lf-
l 
- hL;[(..Lfl - hnY1]1 aw jfi aw 
l l 
= (;;;)"
-l 
, hn [(;;;tl - lmY1] ( 18) 
where the substitution nY 1 = LY. follows from the fact that all firms 
in operation will produce idenifJa{ output. Since (18) is identical to (17) 
except that h is replaced by nh, it follows that 
n. > o ' for all i if nh < a - 1 
For example, if h is just less than 1 and a 
earn positive profi.ts simultaneously. 
3, n + 1 = 3 firms can 
5. CONCLUSION 
The characterization of production sets implicit in some 
classic partial equilibrium analyses of externalities has been shown 
to differ significantly from the minimal a.ssumption used in proving 
the existence of general equilibrium of a competitive economy with 
externalities. Since Davis and Whinston ( 196Z] numerous papers 
have appeared deriving properties of an economic system with 
'1separable externalities. 11 Separable externalities are mathematically 
quite tractable, and often make it possible. to devise institutions 
which can achieve Pareto Optimality in the presence of externalities. 
Within the class of production functions 1�1hich give rise to "separable 
externalities" are, however, production fuoctions which violate 
the convexity properties used in proving ,existence of equilibriwn.. 
[ Arrow and Hahn, 1973] 
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This non-convexity has implicat'lon"s for market structure 
and the existence of equilibrium. We have shown that when both 
the cost function and the production funct:ion are separable, the 
production function must be homogeneous of degree one in the variables 
under the control of the firm. In this case only one firm affected 
by externalities can exist in competitive •equilibrium. It follows that 
it is uninteresting to examine some hypothetical partial equilibrium 
system in which two firms are related by externalities separable 
in both the cost and the· production funcbon, 
When all firms have identical production functions which are 
separable, and exhibit decreasing returns to private inputs, it 
has been shown that the number of firms which can exist in equilibrium 
is a function of the degree of decreasing .Leturns. When all firms 
are identical, the number which can sim1ultaneously earn positive 
profits. is independerit of prices or, consie�quently, demand conditions. 
When firms are dissimilar, as in the case where only one of two 
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firms i s  affected b y  externality, then the number o f  firms which 
can earn positive profits may vary with prices. When market structure 
thus changes with prices, discontinuity can arise in the aggregate 
supply correspondence. Although this discontinuity is a well-known 
consequence of non-convexity, it does not always arise aS a 
result of the non-convexity caused by separable externalities, 
It is a: special case because the way in which firms adjust their 
production plans in the presence of externality can itself serve to 
eliminate or limit the size of the non-convexity. In many but 
not all cases this adjustment is sufficient to guarantee the 
existence of equilibrium. 
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APPENDIX' ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF SEPARABILITY 
The concept of separability which appears in analysis of 
externalities differ from concepts of sepa:rable utility and production 
functions found in classical microeconomic theory and from the definition 
of separable functions used in mathematical programming. We have 
defined separability :in tern-is which imply that all cross·partial derivatives 
between Y 2 and variables controlled by firm l vanish. The survey of 
the place of separability in economic theory by Geary and Morishirna 
[ 1973] contains only one definition of separability equivalent to that used 
in this paper. It is Friscb!s idea of want independence: "the marginal 
utility of good i depends only on good i. 11 (Morishima (1973], p.103) 
Want independence is equivalent to the assumption that relevant cross­
partial derivatives vanish. Geary and Me>rishima comment that "want 
independence is not invariant l.lllder a monotonic transformation . . •  the 
concept is unnecessarily cumbersome; this is underlined by the fact that 
all ofFrisch's results can be obtained from S ono's independence which is 
free of·-cardinal concepts. 11 (p.105) Sono1s independence characterizes 
a function which can be written in the for.m 
f(X ) = F[t<x'> + l (x
2
, .... �>] 
As we have seen. not all production functions which can be written in this 
form are separable, since the relevant cross-partial of f(x) vanishes 
only if F" = 0, and not all su ch functions generate separable cost filllctions. 
The deeper,difference between Sono1s s«�parability and the concept of 
separability relevant to externalities is that the theorems which have been 
proved in the literatuxe on separable externalities do require that 
ozc 
OYlOYz 
= O. An affine transformation of a cost function with this property 
generates different supply and demand curves and observably different 
behavior of the firm. If, for example, C = Y 1 - Y 2 
. 2 2 
2 
and F(G) = G , 
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F = Y1 - 2Y1Y2 + Y2. A firm with this cost function differs in every 
way from a firm with the cost f\ttlction Y1 + Y2• 
Ail.other definition of separability related but not identical to 
that used here is 11homogeneous separability. 11 (Morishima, p. 103) 
A function is homogeneously separable if it can be written as 
U(X ) = u[£1(X!' ... ,X,l. 
f2(Xr+i·····Xr+s
). . . . •  fn(Xt+l'"""'Xu
)] 
where the f
i 
are homogeneous of degree one. Again, this definition 
differs from ours in that it is invariant to affine transformation. 
Moreover, the f\m.ctional form, although similar to {11), differs in two 
crucial respects: h{ Y 2) need not be homogeneous of degree one, and 
a homogeneously separable function does not in general satisfy ( 12 ). 
It follows from these comparisons that the results which follow from the 
definitions of separability used in this paper are somewhat more than 
special cases of known results. 
Davis and Whinston [ 1962] and Marchand and Russell [ 1973] 
refer to a paper by Cham es and Lemke [ 195 4 ]  as the source of their 
definition of separability. Charnes and Lemke state a definition relevant 
to mathematical programming which is not in fact identical to that need 
in analyz-ing externalities. A fWiction F(X1, ... , Xn ) is separable under 
this definition ii it is possible to find n functions gi ( x 1, ... , X n) such that 
F( gl . . .. • ll,,) \ ( gl) + · · · + hn ( ll,, ) [Hadley l 964] 
Not all functions which are separable in this sense exhibit separable 
externalities. 
externality is 
Consider the production function F(Xl' ... , Xn' Y2 ). The 
separable only if there are functions g1 and g2 such that 
F (  gl, • · · • gn, gn+l ) Lh;[ gi( X1, . . . , Xn )] + hn+l[ gn+l( Y2 Jl 
l 
If the functions hi ( gi ) are not all independent of Y 2 then malting the 
:function appear additive fails to separate the externality. The cost 
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function makes things even clearer. If C  = c 1[ g1( Y1, Y2 )] + c 2[ g2( Y1. Y2 )] , 
there is no reason for 
·ic 
oYilY; 
2 
� [ ,,3gi 3gi ' 0 gi ],_, c - - + c --­;,1 i oYI oY2 i oYloY2 
to equal zero. Thus the programming definition of s eparability fails 
to characterize separable externalities .. 
To swnmarize: thoerems on separable externalitie$ depend 
2 
on the assumption that d� �y vanish E�verywhere. The only functions 
I 2 
with thi s property are of the form c1( Y1 )  + c 2 ( Y2 ) .  The class of
production functions which give rise to such cost functions is not 
completely characterized by any of the common definitions of separability 
found elsewhere in economic s or progr,a.mming. 
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